Today’s geopolitical conflicts center around China, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. After one year into the war, China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become the focal point of international affairs. Sino-Russian and Sino-US relations are of great concern to the world—all eyes are watching. As the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait looms, we aim to understand the motivations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders for war and their relationship with China’s Russian ally. In this 3-part series, we will examine the Korean War, the Sino-Vietnam War, and the China-India War to gain insights.
Hello, Welcome to Lei’s Real Talk. I’m Lei.
A few weeks earlier, we talked about how China and Taiwan are both implementing wartime control mechanisms and it feels like we are getting closer to war. Meanwhile, the United States is sending warnings to Communist China that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is likely to lose should it launch an attack on Taiwan. The Americans’ message is clear: The PLA is inferior in combat and therefore Xi Jinping should think twice about invading Taiwan: You make sure you can win before getting into a military conflict. However, this is Western logic, not the CCP’s. The CCP doesn’t care about winning or losing in the same fashion as the West does.
Well then, what is the CCP’s motivation for war? Let’s have a look at the CCP’s history of war. More than 70 years ago, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union were at the centre of another geopolitical crisis: the Korean War. The interactions between Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin, and Kim Il-sung during the Korean War offer us insight into the dynamics of current geopolitics as history may likely repeat itself.
Scheme for the Korean War
The Korean War was the first war the CCP fought outside China’s border. To many, it may be surprising to learn that the purpose of the CCP being involved in the war was to obtain military technology from Russia.
In March 1949, North Korea’s founder Kim Il-sung went to the Soviet Union to convince Stalin to help him seize South Korea. Stalin rejected the idea for fear of U.S. intervention. Kim then turned to Mao Zedong and sent his vice minister of defence to China in April. Mao pledged his support but said that Kim must wait until after Mao took over all of China. At the time, Mao’s army was sweeping across China, defeating Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist army.
After Mao won the civil war and established the People’s Republic of China in October, he visited the Soviet Union from December 1949 to February 1950. It was there, in the USSR, that Mao decided to confront the United States. Stalin, who became less concerned about U.S. involvement, telegraphed Kim on Jan. 30, 1950, to say that he was ready to support his plan to take over South Korea. But he asked Kim to keep it a secret from China.
After Mao left Russia, Stalin and Kim drew up a detailed plan. However, at their last meeting, Stalin scaled back and told Kim that he wouldn’t send troops and that Kim had to ask Mao for help.
On May 13, Kim arrived in Beijing to tell Mao that Stalin agreed to war with South Korea. And at 11:30 that night, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai asked the Soviet ambassador to confirm it. The next morning, Stalin replied: “North Korea can take action; however, please discuss the details with Mao Zedong in person.” Mao then committed to Kim that if the U.S. intervened, China would send troops to North Korea.
Mao moved the war toward his agenda
Mao’s interest in the war was not about helping Kim unify Korea. His goal was to force Stalin to help him build a modern Chinese military. Mao wanted to acquire atomic bomb technology and become a military powerhouse quickly. He calculated that the fastest way to achieve this was by helping Kim in the Korean War.
So on June 25, 1950, Kim Il-sung launched an attack on South Korea, and the United Nations Security Council quickly passed a resolution in support of South Korea. Two days later, U.S. President Harry Truman announced that he was sending troops to support South Korea. He also changed his non-intervention policy toward Taiwan.
U.S. intervention was not bad news for Mao. On July 1, 1950, Mao sent Zhou Enlai to tell the Soviet ambassador “Now we must build up our air force and navy in order to deal with the armed forces of the United States.” On Sept. 15, U.S. troops landed at Inchon in South Korea, cutting off a large number of North Korean troops. On Sept. 29, Kim asked Stalin to help. On Oct. 1, Stalin told Mao, “It is time for the Chinese to act.” So, Mao immediately ordered the Chinese troops already assembled along the North Korean border to get ready.
Mao Zedong
However, all of his Politburo members were against sending troops to Korea. Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, Mao’s two chosen successors years later, strongly opposed the idea. Lin pointed out that a confrontation with the U.S. would cause huge consequences as the U.S. had absolute air control and a 40-to-1 advantage in artillery. If China intervened, the U.S. could destroy Chinese industrial bases in major cities, and even drop atomic bombs.
As I said, winning the war might not be the CCP leader’s concern. Mao had another—a hidden—agenda. He wanted to dispose of the large number of surrendered troops from the Nationalist army during China’s Civil War. Sending them to fight in Korea would serve the purpose. But first, Mao wanted to bargain with Stalin. On Oct. 2, he telegraphed Stalin, telling him of the Politburo’s opposition. And then on Oct. 5, when the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel, which divides Korea, Stalin telephoned to remind Mao that if he didn’t keep his promise to send troops, the USSR wouldn’t help China build its air force or navy.
On Oct. 19, 1950, the Chinese Volunteer Troops went to North Korea. Two months later, they forced the UN troops back across the 38th parallel and restored the North Korean regime. By then, Kim’s army was reduced to about 75,000 men, one-sixth of the 450,000 Chinese volunteer soldiers. Chinese general Peng Dehuai became the commander of the Chinese and North Korean allied forces.
Peng told Mao that the troops should stop at the 38th parallel, but Mao refused. He insisted that the Chinese volunteer soldiers push south. On Dec. 13, he sent a telegram saying they must fight across the 38th parallel. His general returned a telegram, “It’s thirty degrees below zero. Soldiers are exhausted. Many don’t have coats and winter shoes. Many wore single-layer shoes or were even barefoot. They suffer from malnutrition and have night blindness. And unimaginable losses are likely to occur.” Unmoved, Mao only cared about what he wanted.
After the Chinese and North Korean forces took Seoul in early January 1951, President Truman declared a state of national emergency. Secretary of State Dean Acheson called it the worst defeat of the U.S. military in a century.
The UN forces then launched a counter-offensive, and the PLA suffered heavy casualties. On March 1, Mao telegrammed Stalin: “China intends to use her huge human resources to pull down the United States. 100,000 Chinese soldiers have died. We estimate another 300,000 casualties next year. We are sending an addition of 120,000 troops, and increasing the total troops to 300,000. We’ll fight a protracted war with the United States and spend several years to fight off hundreds of thousands of American lives.”
In exchange, Mao Zedong got a modern military. Three months before Truman declared a state of national emergency, the Chinese naval commander went to the Soviet Union to request help in establishing the Chinese navy. In December 1950, a Chinese Air Force delegation visited the Soviet Union, and in February 1951 an agreement was sealed for the Soviet Union to establish an aircraft maintenance factory in China.
By mid-1951, North Korea had been bombed into oblivion and a third of the adult population had perished. Kim Il-sung wanted to end the war. He went to Beijing in June 1951, to discuss peace negotiations with Mao Zedong. But Mao didn’t want a cease-fire because he hadn’t fully achieved his goal of obtaining Russian military technology. He told Kim “to drag the American forces into Korea as far north as possible.”
On July 10, the United Nations and the Chinese-Korean allied forces began negotiations and got stuck on the issue of the repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW). Mao insisted that all of the 20,000 Chinese POWs return to China. Most of them had fought for the Nationalist army. The U.S. insisted on non-compulsory repatriation for humanitarian reasons.
On July 14, 1952, Kim telephoned Mao, requesting him to accept the terms. Mao rejected him.
Then 8 months later, in a speech at Congress on Feb. 2, 1953, newly elected President Dwight Eisenhower mentioned the possible use of the atomic bomb. A nuclear war was music to Mao’s ears and he was absolutely thrilled. He seized the opportunity to ask Stalin for help in building China’s nuclear industry. Stalin, however, didn’t want China to have nuclear weapons and decided to end the war. But on Feb. 28, he suffered a stroke and died a few days later.
After Stalin’s death, the USSR told China to end the Korean War, but Mao insisted on continuing because he still wanted Soviet nuclear technology. But the Soviet Union steadfastly refused it. And on July 27, 1953, a final peace agreement was reached.
Mass sacrifice for CCP’s goal
The Korean War was costly to China. Mao sent about 3 million Chinese troops. Deng Xiaoping once told a Japanese communist leader that 400,000 Chinese died in Korea. Author Michael Breen wrote that of the 21,374 Chinese POWs, two-thirds refused to return to Communist China and that the vast majority chose to go to Taiwan. One-third of the POWs who returned to the mainland were treated as traitors and had a miserable ending.
As you can see from the Korean War, the CCP’s rationale for launching or ending a war follows a different set of priorities and calculations because it has no regard for human suffering and loss of life. Mao used the Korean War to dispose of soldiers from the Nationalist army and build a modern Chinese military.
By the end of the war, China remained a poor country but had the third largest air force in the world, with 3,000 warplanes. From Mao’s perspective, he was the winner even though the Chinese lost hundreds of thousands of lives.
The biggest irony to the CCP is that despite the sacrifices the Chinese made in the war, the North Koreans are not grateful to the Chinese. When the staff at the Chinese War Memorial in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, was asked how many Chinese volunteer soldiers died during the war, the reply was “maybe 10,000.” In the North Korean version of history, Kim Il-sung was the “sole hero” who “fought against the invaders.”
In the next part, we’ll talk about the Vietnam War, which also involves China, Russia and the United States.
