To obtain control of the Chinese military, Xi Jinping started a military reform in 2015. The reform shifted the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a focus on national defense to a preparation for war. And the creation of new military branches, the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force, also served this purpose. However, the reform sowed distrust and triggered a loyalty crisis, which is now manifesting, but the CCP leader isn’t aware of how the situation came to be or what the fundamental problem is.
This is the last one of a 3-part series on Chinese leaders’ relations with their military. In the first part, we explored the perpetual tug of war between the Party and the military; and in the second part, we discussed how Xi Jinping obtained power through a military reform. In this part, we’ll discuss the problem that the reform has left behind, which is causing a loyalty crisis today.
Xi Jinping’s military reform aims to consolidate his power and modernize the PLA’s structure. However, this change altered the power structure and created increasingly complex relationships among the PLA’s main components, becoming a breeding ground for conflicts and disobedience.
Xi’s confidants making up the CMC
In his reform of the PLA, Xi Jinping tried to incorporate the modern concept into its structure and flattened the PLA organizations. He hoped to manage all of the military components through his 7-person Central Military Commission (CMC), which served as the highest governing body of the PLA. But the Commission is made up of only people he trusts.
Other than Xi himself, vice chairman Zhang Youxia is in charge of personnel and the other vice chairman He Weidong is in charge of Taiwan military operations. Other members are Li Shangfu, the defense minister; Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department; Miao Hua, the Director of the Political Work Department and Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission.
Xi’s priorities for the PLA are evident in the composition of the Commission’s personnel. He has 3 people handling internal politics and disciplines, 2 managing military operations and the defense minister dealing with external relations.
Role change leading to demoralization
Before Xi’s military reform, the Central Military Commission had 11 members, the chief commanders of the military services, including the air force, navy, and army, were integral parts of the committee, following others including the chairman, two vice chairmen, the defense minister, the heads of the four general departments under the Commission.
After the reform, the CMC was reduced to seven members, and the service chiefs were no longer part of this influential body. In fact, their roles were diminished, placing them below the heads of the theater commands.
This significant change led to a sense of discouragement among the service chiefs. When these leaders become demoralized, it inevitably affects the morale of their respective troops, given the close relationships they share. This demoralization might be one of the contributing factors to loyalty issues within branches like the Rocket Force, leading to resistance when it comes to wartime readiness. Similar challenges may also persist in other branches of the PLA.
New structure not serving singular loyalty
To prevent each military unit from becoming too powerful, Xi Jinping’s reform flattened the PLA organizations. He dismantled the 4 general departments of the Military Commission and replaced them with 15 smaller departments. He separated the war command from the military branches. On the surface, he adopted a modernized, decentralized structure similar to that of the American military. But the problem is, that this decentralized, modern structure is incompatible with the CCP’s top-down, centralized ideology.
Before the reform, the 7 military regions were independent military units. Each one was fully responsible for the training, development, and war command of the troops. Lower-rank officers and servicemen had to obey their superiors, and the commander of the military region decided the fate of each soldier and officer, whether in training or on the battlefield.
After the reform, however, the PLA now has two separate chains of command: an administrative chain, in which authority flows from the Military Commission to the military services and the troops, and a war operation chain from the Commission to the theater commands and the troops. In short, the head of each military service is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping personnel, while the theater commands are responsible for joint exercises and combat operations.
For example, the Navy’s day-to-day training is managed by the Navy commander. But if war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, the Eastern Theater Command will take over to command the Navy. It seems logical enough, but this dual command structure has a problem for the PLA: It creates disloyalty.
Here’s how it does that: Military servicemen are recruited directly into each military branch and spend most of their time with that branch, so their loyalty lies with the branch command. This doesn’t appear problematic since Xi and the CCP require “singular, complete and absolute loyalty” from the PLA. Yet if war breaks out and there is a command shift, as required by the new military structure, it’s questionable whether the troops will trust the theater command in a life-and-death situation because camaraderie, collaboration, and loyalty are lacking.
For example, once a war breaks out, is the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command able to command the Strategic Support Force and the Rocket Force?
Lack of Collaboration and Decision-Making Abilities
The cornerstone of the CCP’s command chain and management style is centralized decision-making, with all levels below the decision-maker required to obey and follow orders. This structure doesn’t encourage improvisation or collaboration. After decades under CCP rule, collaboration or teamwork isn’t a strong suit of mainland Chinese operations.
For instance, China lags behind the United States in industrial software development. Developing quality industrial software demands the collaboration of software experts and industrial professionals over many years as the software continuously improves. Whether in sports, research, and development, or military operations, effective teamwork is notably lacking in CCP-controlled endeavors. Communist regimes can order thousands of athletes or students to perform synchronized moves, but they struggle to foster true collaboration among individuals due to eroded trust.
In the United States, military operations are built upon a network of smaller combat units, each empowered with certain authority on the battlefield. Frontline personnel can request support from other military services, resulting in a decentralized structure that enhances decision-making and operational efficiency. This approach relies on mutual trust, respect, and strong camaraderie.
However, such an operational model is unattainable for the PLA. Their frontline soldiers can only follow orders but lack the authority to make decisions. The CCP’s ideology and command style thrive in a centralized system, fundamentally conflicting with the modern concept of a decentralized military.
Of course, in cases where U.S. theater commanders have differing opinions from the chiefs of staff of the military services, they engage in communication and coordination. In contrast, China’s PLA tends to avoid making decisions at lower levels, preferring to escalate them up the command chain to the top leader, Xi Jinping, who often makes the final call.
Fundamental issue
This situation can be traced back to a fundamental problem within the PLA: its allegiance lies with the Party, not the country, and the Party exercises control over every aspect. In fact, calls for genuine reform within the PLA, which would break away from the Party’s control, have been made.
In 1988, an article advocating the nationalization of the military appeared in an internal journal of the Jinan Military Region. It proposed that the PLA should undergo a transformation to become an army in service of the republic rather than the Party.
In 2001, a group of mid- and lower-ranking officers from the General Staff, Political, and Logistics Departments authored a document titled “Suggestions from the Military Reformists.” It presented various recommendations, including the restructuring of the PLA into a non-political organization that remains neutral in domestic politics, focusing solely on its constitutional duty of national defense. This document is said to have gained approval from top military figures and reflects sentiments widespread within the military.
In recent years, there has been increasing talk about the “de-politicization of the military.” General Liu Yazhou was among those who advocated this idea and opposed the invasion of Taiwan. However, he now finds himself detained and under investigation.
In summary, Xi Jinping initiated military reform in 2015. More than seven years have elapsed, and there is still no news regarding the completion of this reform. Has the reform achieved Xi’s intended objectives? While it may have seemed promising on paper, it hasn’t proven effective for the world’s largest military—and its leader may not even be fully aware of the extent of the challenges it faces. In fact, Xi Jinping has recently grappled with a crisis of military loyalty. For a comprehensive understanding of the relations between the CCP and the PLA, please refer to the first and second parts of this series.
